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Abstract 
It is the fact that wireless networks have become one 
of the most widely used communication systems in 
the world due to the wireless network’s natures. 
However, at the same time providing secure 
communication for wireless networks has become 
one of the prime concerns.  There are many ways to 
improve security issues, one of them, titled quantum 
cryptography, namely quantum key distribution 
(QKD), offers the promise of unconditional security.  
It is well known that traditional QKD can work well 
in the traditional networks because of the full optical 
system will meet the requirement of photon 
communication, which becomes serious problem in 
wireless communication system, as in free space 
photon transmission is the difficulty in providing 
line-of-sight (LOS) between the transmitter and the 
receiver for long distances.  In this paper, we are 
going to focus on two dimensional (2D) fuzzy 
dynamic switching between the transmitter and the 
receiver for reasonable long distances.  The research 
results show fuzzy dynamic switching has potential 
capability to carry on this project and the future 
papers will follow for 3D cases. 
1. Introduction 
As the wireless communication has gone through 
rapid advancements during the last few decades, an 
increasing number of government agencies, 
businesses and home users are either using, or 
considering using, wireless technologies in their 
environments [1, 4, 24]. Therefore it is the fact that 
in the near future wireless technology will dominate 
the communication industry. While wireless 
networks and its applications are becoming popular 
every day, security issues associated with have 
become a great concern. In this paper we are going to 
make a novel protocol with a method to create an 
implementation of quantum cryptography for key 
distribution in Wi-Fi networks. 
As wireless communications use the airwaves, 
they are intrinsically more vulnerable to 
interceptions and attacks than their wired 
counterparts. As the service become more popular, 
there are a great number of security risks associated 
with the current wireless protocols and encryption 
methods [6, 8]. Some of the common types of attacks 
against wireless networks are; Denial of Service 
(DoS) attacks, Identity theft (MAC spoofing), Man-
in-the-middle attacks, ARP poisoning, etc. DoS 
attacks are typically associated with 802.11 wireless 
communications [24]. 
Based on the laws of physics, quantum 
cryptography allows exchange of cryptographic key 
between two remote parties with unconditional 
security.   Quantum cryptography is used to produce 
and distribute a key, known as Quantum Key 
Distribution (QKD). Several QKD protocols such as 
BB84, B92 [20] and six-state [18] exist in optical 
communications, in particular with optical fiber 
systems, as of now. Out of those, BB84 is more 
popular and widely used in practical networks [25]. 
As the nature of BB84 and B92 [18, 20, 21] we have 
chosen a variation of BB84 called SARG04 (Scarani, 
Acin, Ribordy, and Gisin) [21] to employ in our 
current work. SARG04 is robust against photon-
number splitting (PNS) attack [21]. Explaining how 
SARG04 protocol works is not in scope of this 
paper.  QKD has gone through significant 
advancements in optical networks [17, 19]. However, 
QKD with respect to free-space is showing rather 
slow progress. One of the main reasons for this slow 
progress in free space photon transmission is the 
difficulty in providing Line-Of-Sight (LOS) between 
the transmitter and the receiver for long distances.  
However, there are some papers discussed this issue, 
we may use different models for different situations 
of the multi-path communication channels, such as 
almost-LOS (ALOS), quasi-LOS (QLOS), non-LOS 
(NLOS) with responding statistic distributions, 
which will not be discussed in our current paper.     
In our work, we target the IEEE 802.11 wireless 
network to integrate with quantum cryptography 
with fuzzy logic control. This is because the 
coverage area of 802.11 network small, the line-of-
sight issue between the participating entities can be 
minimized. Therefore, currently we assume the LOS 
problem is not major concern in this paper. 
In this paper we are focusing on how to deal with 
LOS problem with Fuzzy logic method.  Next we 
shall discuss IEEE 802.11i standard then we 
highlight our QKD system, by which LOS problem 
will occur.  In the section IV we show our fuzzy 
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system for switching.  The conclusion will present in 
section V. 
 
2 IEEE 802.11i Standard 
 Before we introduce our new protocol, we need 
to have a closer look at IEEE 802.11i standard as 
some of which shall be introduced into our current 
work.  The security of 802.11 is defined by Wired 
Equivalent Privacy (WEP).  However WEP was 
identified by cryptanalysts to have severe security 
weaknesses. As a result of this, an amendment to the 
IEEE 802.11 standard called IEEE 802.11i [3] was 
approved in 2004. 
IEEE 802.11i is designed to provide enhanced 
security in the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer 
for 802.11 networks. It defines two classes of 
security algorithms: Robust Security Network 
Association (RSNA) and Transition Security 
Network (TSN). IEEE 802.11i describes two new 
confidentiality algorithms to address those two 
cipher suites, namely Temporal Key Integrity 
Protocol (TKIP) and Counter-mode/CBC-MAC 
Protocol (CCMP) respectively [12].  IEEE 802.1X 
offers an effective framework for authenticating, 
managing keys and controlling user traffic to protect 
large networks. It employs the Extensible 
Authentication Protocol (EAP) [13] to allow a wide 
variety of authentication mechanisms, which we are 
going to keep it in our current work.  The EAP 
integration with QKD will be discussed in the next 
section.  
 RSNA defines two types of key hierarchies to 
divide initial key material into useful keys. The two 
key hierarchies are: Pairwise key hierarchy, which is 
used to protect unicast traffic and, Group key 
hierarchy which is used to protect multicast and 
broadcast traffic. We can show the simplified block 
diagram of a point-to point QKD link in concept in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: simplified block diagram of a point-to-point QKD link 
in concept[23].  
3. QKD for Wireless Networks 
Quantum cryptography or QKD is one area that 
did not get enough attention in wireless networks so 
far with respect to providing secrete key distribution.  
Even though there are lots of things need to be 
investigated before this technology applies to the real 
world.  Our current work is part of the contributions 
toward to the final successful target.  In this section 
we are going to build a bridge between QKD and 
wireless networks.  
 In 802.11i networks there are two places where 
the mutual authentication can be employed. Firstly, 
by selecting a correct EAP type such as EAP-TLS, 
EAP-TTLS that offer mutual authentication during 
IEEE 802.1X authentication process. Secondly, the 
IEEE 802.11i 4-way handshake makes the mutual 
authentication happens in second and third messages. 
In the second message of 4-way handshake, 
authenticator receives the reply and message 
integrity code (MIC) from the supplicant. 
Authenticator checks the received and calculated 
MIC values to authenticate the Supplicant. In the 
third message, Authenticator sends the calculated 
MIC to the Supplicant.  Supplicant then checks the 
MIC to authenticate the Authenticator, achieving 
mutual authentication.  
In our work, we paid special attention on the stage 
where the mutual authentication takes place in 
802.11i networks. Therefore, we shall take the 
advantage of EAP types such as EAP-TLS, EAP-
TTLS which offer mutual authentication, to merge 
802.11i networks with QKD. In order to make QKD 
well match wireless communications, i.e. our aim is 
to introduce quantum key transmission soon after the 
802.1X authentication is completed. The proposed 
protocol is shown in figure 2.  
  
 
Figure 2: The Proposed Protocol [22] 
As described in flow 13 of figure 1, the last 
message of 802.1X protocol is the EAPOL message 
giving the EAP Key from Authenticator to the 
Supplicant. Since the two parties are mutually 
authenticated at this stage, we know that this 
message is genuine. We use this message as the 
starting point of quantum transmission. By this way 
we can safely start the quantum key exchange. As 
soon as the Supplicant receives the EAP Key 
message, the communication switches to quantum 
channel. 
 Once the photon transmission finishes, the 
communication switches back to classical wireless 
channel. Afterwards they complete the SARG04 
quantum key exchange as shown in flows 3 to 6 of 
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Figure 2.  Some of the transferred bits will get 
discarded during the final key recovery process of 
SARG04 protocol.  Our next aim is to set the length 
of Q-Key equal to the length of PTK.  For example, 
CCMP, PTK is 256 bits, while TKIP occupies 384 
bits for PMK.  So that we have to make sure the 
derived Q-Key will contain bits greater than or equal 
to the number of bits of PTK.   We get this stripped 
Q-Key as the PTK.   
Then from PTK, we can derive KEK, KCK and 
TK, while from KCK, MIC can be calculated. We 
shall use this MIC in our subsequent protocol 
messages to implement mutual authentication. In 
order to simplify the operation in wireless networks 
at this stage, Supplicant performs XOR operation 
with the MIC and the first set of bits of equal length 
in PMK. We call this resulted MIC as Quantum MIC 
(Q-MIC) and make the following protocol: 
  Q-MIC = (MIC) XOR (first bits of PMK 
equivalent  
                             to the length of MIC) 
 Supplicant verifies the Q-MIC to authenticate the 
Authenticator, thus achieving the mutual 
authentication. From now on, both parties use TK to 
encrypt the data and start secure communication and 
also use the GTK for multicast applications if 
needed. 
Recent research work explores some of the flaws 
of 4-way handshake [5, 6, 8, 16]. It was shown that 
the message 1 of 4-way handshake is subject to DoS 
attacks.  For example, intruders can flood message 1 
to the supplicant after the 4-way handshake has 
completed, causing the system to fail. Since key 
distribution of our protocol is done by the SARG04 
protocol. 
 In order to under our protocol let’s assume an 
eavesdropper send a fake photon transmission 
towards Authenticator soon after the EAP Key 
message (flow 2 of Figure 2).  Then once the Q-Key 
is derived by SARG04 process, supplicant sends Q-
MIC to Authenticator in flow 7. Authenticator can 
check this Q-MIC value as it has all the ingredients 
to generate its own Q-MIC.   
4. Fuzzy Switching System in QKD 
 It is clear, from above description, that the 
photon communication becomes a vital issue in 
QKD.  For the 802.11 networks, even it has a 
reasonable good area covering the communications 
but for QKD it would be a problem to “just” 
transmitter right hitting receiver, which is called 
“LOS” problem.  We propose a 2D fuzzy switching 
system as shown in this section to tentatively run our 
system, which shows that the dynamic switching has 
good potential for our system.   The future 3D 
system will follow in our next paper. 
The fuzzy decision problem introduced by 
Bellman and Zadeh [26] has as a goal the 
maximization of the minimum value of the 
membership functions of the objectives to be 
optimized.  Accordingly, the fuzzy optimization 
model can be represented as a multiobjective 
programming problem as follows: 
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 In above equation, the objective is to maximize 
the minimum membership function of all delay, 
denoted by D, and difference between the 
recommend value and the measured value, denoted 
by U. 
The control system is shown in Figure 3.  The 
first estimated angle is input and then the set motor 
controller will run follow the feedback values from 
the photon receiver & comparing.  The outputs are 
three: anti-clock (or called “negative”); no change 
(or called “zero”); and clockwise (or called 
“positive”).  There are two ranges are defined, 
namely “negative” = -100 to 0.0) and “positive” = 
0.0 to +100. 
 
Figure 3: Control system 
There are two inputs for this control system, namely 
(1) the “difference” of the angles between the existed 
value and the measured value, which is for the step 
motor to just the transmitter and receiver direction.  
When those two values are perfectly matching, the 
LOS is recognized and this “difference” ideal value 
would be zero. (2) the “differential” of the angles 
that describe how “quickly” to get the angles 
changed and in which direction changing (anti-clock 
or clockwise directions).  Those two inputs are 
shown in Figure 4 with some values we have used in 
our testing. 
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Figure 4: Degree of Memberships for the two input 
in our fuzz control system. 
For the rule structure and matrix, we have: 
1. If the existed angle value – measured value = 
negative and d(existed angle value –measured 
value)/dt = negative THEN output = anti-clock 
turn 
2. If the existed angle value – measured value = 
zero and d(existed angle value –measured 
value)/dt = negative THEN output = clockwise 
turn 
3. If the existed angle value – measured value = 
positive and d(existed angle value –measured 
value)/dt = negative THEN output = anti-clock 
turn 
4. If the existed angle value – measured value = 
negative and d(existed angle value –measured 
value)/dt = zero THEN output = anti-clock turn 
5. If the existed angle value – measured value = 
zero and d(existed angle value –measured 
value)/dt = zero THEN output = no change 
(zero) 
6. If the existed angle value – measured value = 
positive and d(existed angle value –measured 
value)/dt = zero THEN output = clockwise turn 
7. If the existed angle value – measured value = 
negative and d(existed angle value –measured 
value)/dt = positive THEN output = anti-clock 
turn 
8. If the existed angle value – measured value = 
zero and d(existed angle value –measured 
value)/dt = positive THEN output = anti-clock 
turn 
9. If the existed angle value – measured value = 
positive and d(existed angle value –measured 
value)/dt = positive THEN output = clockwise 
turn 
Therefore, we have the matrix from the nine rules to 
as shown in below: 
 
where AC= anti-clock direction; CW=clockwise 
direction and NC= no change (or zero). 
As an example, we have two inputs say “difference” 
= -6 and “differential” = +2.5, as shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5: An example for the fuzzy calculation. Two 
inputs say “difference” = -6 and “differential” = 
+2.5. 
The calculation result is -63.4% anti-clock direction 
as shown in Figure 6 and defuzzification process for 
crisp output is taken by “root sum square” (RSS).  
 
 
Some final testing results are shown in below: 
1. Two inputs: “difference” = -3 and 
“differential” = +1.25 then output = -55.1% 
anti-clock direction; 
2. Two inputs: “difference” = 0 and 
“differential” = +2.5 then output = -50.1% 
anti-clock direction; 
3. Two inputs: “difference” = +3 and 
“differential” = +2.5 then output = -10.8% 
anti-clock direction; 
4. Two inputs: “difference” = +1 and 
“differential” = +2.5 then output = +12.1% 
clockwise direction; 
The dynamic control system works and the result is 
fairly reasonable, which gives the enough photon to 
be communicated by the wireless channel. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Risks are inherent in wireless technology. Most 
significant source of risks in wireless networks is 
that the technology’s underlying communication 
medium, the airwave, is open to intruders. Due to 
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this reason a lot of efforts have been put to address 
security issues in wireless networks.   
The advantage of quantum cryptography over traditional 
key exchange methods is that the exchange of information 
can be shown to be secure in a very strong sense, without 
making assumptions about the intractability of certain 
mathematical problems. But the LOS problem becomes 
one of major barriers in this application.  In our work, we 
take advantage of fuzzy logical control in our designed 
QKD system to merge with IEEE 802.11i wireless 
network.  We have noted the there is huge potential 
capability to carry on this project and the future 
papers will follow for 3D cases due to the conference 
paper size. 
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